邓秋成, 白雪飞, 郭立, 王尧. ECC密码算法的差分功耗分析攻击研究[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2011, 28(2): 149-152.
引用本文: 邓秋成, 白雪飞, 郭立, 王尧. ECC密码算法的差分功耗分析攻击研究[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2011, 28(2): 149-152.
DENG Qiu-cheng, BAI Xue-fei, GUO Li, WANG Yao. Research on Differential Power Analysis Attack on ECC Algorithm[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2011, 28(2): 149-152.
Citation: DENG Qiu-cheng, BAI Xue-fei, GUO Li, WANG Yao. Research on Differential Power Analysis Attack on ECC Algorithm[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2011, 28(2): 149-152.

ECC密码算法的差分功耗分析攻击研究

Research on Differential Power Analysis Attack on ECC Algorithm

  • 摘要: 对基于有限域GF(2m)上椭圆曲线密码算法的Montgomery Ladder点乘算法进行了差分功耗分析攻击.首先用Verilog HDL实现了该算法并且用Chartered 0.35 μm CMOS工艺将RTL代码综合成电路网表,以便更精确的获取电路运行中所产生的功耗信息.然后用差分功耗分析攻击中的ZEMD攻击方法,并采用算法中P2的横坐标作为中间变量对功耗曲线进行分类,攻击结果显示,Montgomery Ladder算法不能抗ZEMD差分功耗分析攻击.证明了该算法并不安全,在实际应用中还应该采取一些保护措施.

     

    Abstract: In this paper, we described adifferential power analysis attack on the Montgomery Ladder algorithm based on the finite field GF(2m). We first implemented the algorithm with Verilog HDL, and then synthesized it to the netlist using the Charted 0.35μm CMOS technology, thus we can get the power information accurately. We performed a ZEMD differential power analysis attack on this algorithm subsequently, and use the abscissa of P2, a variable of the Montgomery Ladder algorithm, as the intermediate variable to classify the power curves, the result shows that the Montgomery Ladder algorithm couldn′t resist the ZEMD differential power analysis attack. So the algorithm is not secure enough, we need to take some more protective measures in practice.

     

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