一种木马电路的实现与特征分析
The Implementation and Analysis of a Trojan Circuit in IC Chips
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摘要: 由于硬件木马等恶意电路的隐蔽性,攻击者可以利用其窃取机密信息,破坏硬件电路,造成严重的经济损失与社会危害.本文基于典型的芯片设计流程与EDA工具,首先建立硬件木马的电路模型,然后尝试在一简单ADC芯片中,利用其电路的剩余空间,设计实现了一种计数器木马电路.该木马电路的规模大约占芯片总面积的5.6%,将受污染的电路与真实电路一起用标准CMOS工艺HJ0.25μm流片,然后采用旁路功耗分析技术进行深入分析.实验数据表明,在正常工作情况下,受污染和没受污染的芯片功耗并无明显差异,而当木马触发条件满足时,受污染的芯片却成功的实现了攻击.Abstract: Hidden Trojan circuits provide an attacker with a stealthy attack vector.Trojan circuits can bypass traditional defensive techniques as they occupy a layer below the entire software stack.We present the design and implementation of a counter Trojan circuits into a IC chip by standard CMOS technology HJ0.25um,then we analyze such flexible hardware allows powerful,general purpose attacks,while remaining surprisingly low in the amount of additional hardware.