杨正文, 郭筝. 抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(9): 1-6.
引用本文: 杨正文, 郭筝. 抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(9): 1-6.
YANG Zheng-wen, GUO Zheng. Masking scheme against correlation power analysis on DES[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2019, 36(9): 1-6.
Citation: YANG Zheng-wen, GUO Zheng. Masking scheme against correlation power analysis on DES[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2019, 36(9): 1-6.

抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案

Masking scheme against correlation power analysis on DES

  • 摘要: 以相关性功耗分析为代表的旁路攻击技术对密码设备的安全性造成严重威胁, 针对这种情况, 本文提出了一种新型的抗相关性功耗攻击的掩码防护方案.该方案是一种流水线式的"非对称掩码技术", 通过流水线式操作, 使得加密过程中的每一轮都引入了不同的随机掩码, 功耗和操作数之间的相关性被扰乱, 从而抵御相关性攻击.我们通过功耗仿真, 采集了标准DES、对称掩码方案及本文提出防护方案对应的功耗仿真曲线, 并对其进行相关性功耗攻击.实验结果表明, 标准DES需要1 000条可以攻击成功, 对称掩码方案需要4 000条功耗曲线可以攻击成功, 非对称防护方案则需要50 000条曲线才能攻击成功, 防护能力提升了10倍以上, 掩码方案可以有效抵抗相关性功耗分析.

     

    Abstract: With the situation that side channel attack poses a serious threat to the security of cryptographic devices, we propose a new scheme of pipelined "asymmetric masking technology" against correlation power analysis and implement it in DES algorithm. Through pipelined operation, different random masks are introduced in each round of the encryption process, so that the correlation between power consumption and processing data is disturbed and we can resist correlation power analysis. Through power simulation, we collected the standard DES, symmetric mask scheme and the power simulation curve corresponding to the proposed protection scheme, and conducted related power consumption attacks. The experimental results show that the standard DES requires 1000 power consumption curves, and the symmetric mask scheme requires 4000 power consumption curves to successfully attack. The protection scheme proposed in this paper requires 50, 000 curves to successfully attack, and the protection capability is improved by more than 10 times. We can say that scheme can achieve great protection.

     

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