李红, 贺章擎, 徐元中. 一种基于随机指令延迟的抗旁路攻击处理器结构[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2016, 33(5): 6-9, 14.
引用本文: 李红, 贺章擎, 徐元中. 一种基于随机指令延迟的抗旁路攻击处理器结构[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2016, 33(5): 6-9, 14.
LI Hong, HE Zhang-qing, XU Yuan-zhong. An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2016, 33(5): 6-9, 14.
Citation: LI Hong, HE Zhang-qing, XU Yuan-zhong. An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2016, 33(5): 6-9, 14.

一种基于随机指令延迟的抗旁路攻击处理器结构

An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks

  • 摘要: 提出了一种基于随机延迟的高效的抗旁路攻击处理器结构, 综合采用随机指令调度、随机指令注入和随机流水段延迟技术以抵抗旁路攻击.基于ARM7处理器实现了该架构, 实现结果表明本处理器比原始ARM7处理器增加了约20%的硬件面积.通过相关系数分析攻击(Correlation Power Analysis, CPA)实验证明, 采用本架构的处理器具备有极高的抗旁路攻击防护能力, 可以应用在USBKEY、智能卡(Smart CARD)等高安全应用场合.

     

    Abstract: In this article, based on random delay insertion, an effective processor architecture resistant to side-channel attacks was proposed. It used a combination of randomized scheduling, randomized instruction insertion and randomized pipeline-delay to resist side-channel attacks. On the base of ARM7 processor, we implemented this architecture and the implementation results showed that this processor has increased approximate 20% in hardware area than the original ARM7 processor. The CPA attack experiment results suggested that our new secure processor have high capacity to resist side-channel attacks and thus could be used in USBKEY, Smart CARD and other application scenarios which require extremely high security level.

     

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