朱文锋, 郭筝. 抗二阶DPA分析的ZUC算法防护方案及硬件实现[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(9): 44-49.
引用本文: 朱文锋, 郭筝. 抗二阶DPA分析的ZUC算法防护方案及硬件实现[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(9): 44-49.
ZHU Wen-feng, GUO Zheng. ZUC algorithm protection scheme and hardware implementation of against second-order DPA analysis[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2019, 36(9): 44-49.
Citation: ZHU Wen-feng, GUO Zheng. ZUC algorithm protection scheme and hardware implementation of against second-order DPA analysis[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2019, 36(9): 44-49.

抗二阶DPA分析的ZUC算法防护方案及硬件实现

ZUC algorithm protection scheme and hardware implementation of against second-order DPA analysis

  • 摘要: 对于不带防护的ZUC算法硬件实现, 容易DPA攻击的影响.为此提出了基于二阶算术加、有限域sbox二阶全掩码、sbox固定掩码以及伪轮防护方案的ZUC算法防护方案, 理论上可以抗二阶DPA攻击, 在FPGA上对其进行了实现, 并在硬件实现进行了一定的优化, 节省了功耗和面积.我们通过FPGA功耗采集平台, 采集带防护的ZUC算法硬件实现的功耗曲线, 对其进行DPA攻击, 没有攻击出正确密钥, 表明我们的防护方案实际有效, 大大增加了功耗分析攻击的难度.

     

    Abstract: For the ZUC algorithm hardware implementation without protection, it is easy to influence the DPA attack.To this end, we propose a ZUC algorithm protection scheme based on second-order arithmetic addition, finite-domain sbox second-order full mask, sbox fixed mask and pseudo-wheel protection scheme, which can theoretically resist second-order DPA attacks.The ZUC algorithm protection scheme is implemented on the FPGA, and the hardware implementation is optimized to save power and area.We use the FPGA power consumption acquisition platform to collect the power consumption curve of the protected ZUC algorithm hardware, and perform DPA attacks on it. No correct key is attacked, indicating that our protection scheme is practical and effective, greatly increasing the power analysis attack difficulty.

     

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